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GOVERNING THE SULPHUR DIOXIDE EMISSIONS OF MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS: PUTTING THE BRAKES ON THE RACE-TO-THE-BOTTOM
Maren Zimmer*
INTRODUCTION
Multinational corporations are now part of global politics. For effective governance of 
international environmental problems, their roles in the political process cannot be ig-
race has occurred as a reaction to sulphur dioxide (SO2) regulation, resulting in a need 
for increased global governance surrounding environmental issues.  The paper focuses 
on SO2 because the Trail Smelter case,1 which is seen as the birth case for international 
environmental law, recognized the harm stemming from this pollutant in 1941; scien-
tific evidence has also linked SO2 emissions to acid rain and respiratory problems as-
sociated with smog,2  .dnuopmoc eht gnitaluger ni edam neeb evah stnemecnavda dna 
However, despite the advancements that have been made in regulating SO2 pollution 
in Canada and in other developed nations, global SO2 emissions have risen.3 Given the 
-
als, and transboundary harm resulting from air pollution, a new international struc-
ture is needed – one that looks at environmental problems from an issue-level, and one 
that includes multinational corporations in relevant decision-making processes. 
*  Maren Zimmer is a third year law student at Dalhousie University’s Schulich School of Law. 
Her main academic interest is in Environmental Law. Before entering law school, Maren completed 
a bachelor of Environmental Studies at the University of Waterloo, and worked as an environmental 
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5th ed. (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery Publications Limited, 1993) at 750 (referred to as Trail Smelter case throughout the 
paper).
2  Environment Canada, “Acid Rain and Air Quality” The Green Lane (viewed 30 October 2009), 
3  Allen S. Lefohn, Janja D. Husar & Rudolf B. Husar, “Estimating historic anthropogenic global 
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This topic is timely given the complex questions that surround environmental regula-­‐‑
tion  of  multinational  corporations  when  dealing  with  air  pollution.     Given  the  state  
of  scientific  knowledge  about  the  movement  of  air  pollution  and  the  harm  stemming  
from compounds released into the air, it is imperative that this issue be examined. 
Specifically,   the   increasing   importance  of   the  regulation  of  greenhouse  gases  associ-­‐‑
ated  with  global  climate  change  necessitates  such  a  study.    The  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om  as-­‐‑
sociated with SO2  and  the  ineffectiveness  of  multinational  regulation  at  the  global  level  
highlight  the  need  to  rethink  future  global  atmospheric  policy.  
The paper will begin with a case study on SO2 that explores the history and regulation 
of the compound.  I will examine regulation at the international and domestic levels, 
and then explore how global smelting operations and SO2  emissions  have  shi ed  into  
the  developing  world.    My  evidence  weakly  indicates  a  shi ,  but  does  show  that  global  
emissions have not decreased despite increased regulation.  I will then discuss the 
race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om  theory,  environmental  regulation  in  general,  and  new  international  
approaches to the problem.  In conclusion, I propose that environmental regulation 
needs to occur at the global level and from an issue perspective.  In order to be ef-­‐‑
fective,  this  decision-­‐‑making  process  should  include  various  stakeholders,  including  
multinational corporations.
I. CASE STUDY: THE REGULATION OF SO2 AND THE RACE-TO-THE-BOTTOM
The issue of SO2 pollution hit the global consciousness with the recognition that harm 
from  acid  rain  was  linked  to  SO2  emissions:  “[s]ignificant  damage  to  forests  became  a  
high  priority  environmental  issue  around  1980,  while  thousands  of  lakes  in  Scandinavia  
lost  fish  populations  due  to  acidification  from  the  1950’s  to  the  1980’s.”4  This recogni-­‐‑
tion led to individual, state, and international action, as well as corporate policies and 
technologies to address the problem.  Increased regulatory pressure in developed na-­‐‑
tions  had  the  potential  to  effect  a  shi   in  smelting  operations  to  less  regulated  nations.  
Based  on   the  evidence,   a   shi    in   these  operations   toward  countries  with   fewer  SO2 
regulations can be seen through the increase in air pollution problems in Asia and 
other areas in the developing world.5  Much of the advancement in pollution control 
has  been  seen  through  the  advancement  in  pollution  reduction  technology;  however,  
“[w]hile  the  emission  of  pollutants  can  be  significantly  reduced  for  a  small  cost,  few  
developing nations have made even small investments in pollution reduction mea-­‐‑
sures,  even  though  the  environmental  and  population  health  benefits  of  such  measures  
are evident.”6  While polluting companies may move to less developed countries, it is 
4     United  Nations  Environment  Programme,  “Global  Environment  Outlook  3[GEO  3]”  United  
Nations  (2009),  online:  UNEP  <h p://www.unep.org/geo/geo3/english/366.htm>  (excerpt  from  chap-­‐‑
ter 2) at 210. 
5     World  Health  Organization,  “Air  Quality  guidelines  -­‐‑  Global  Update  2005”  WHO  (2005),  online:  
WHO  <h p://www.who.int/phe/health_topics/outdoorair_aqg/en/index.html>.
6     Supra  note  4  at  211.  
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not always true that the technologies used in their home states also move with them.  
This  section  will  look  at  the  history  of  SO2  regulation,  starting  with  the  Trail Smelter 
case and moving into the contemporary regulatory environment.
1. Limitations of the Case Study
There are a number of limitations of the following case study.  First, the data gathered 
in  this  paper  is  mainly  derived  from  secondary  sources.    Second,  when  embarking  on  
a search of legislation in other jurisdictions, I was greatly limited by my linguistic abil-­‐‑
ity, which resulted in my reliance on data from Anglophone countries only. Third, the 
lack  of  public  emission  reporting  was  a  barrier  to  determining  SO2 levels from both 
countries and corporations.  Finally, the complexity of corporate business resulting 
from mergers and acquisitions resulted in a barrier to following corporations’ activities 
over time. 
2. The Trail Smelter Case: An Early Example of Litigation Surrounding SO2
In  1941,  a  final  arbitration  decision  was  released  by  a  tribunal  mutually  agreed  upon  
between  the  affected  parties  to  address  the  issue  of  environmental  harm  to  farmers’  
fields   in  Washington   State   stemming   from   a   Canadian   smelting   operation   in   Trail,  
British  Columbia.7    The  two  states  sought  resolution  a er  an  impasse  was  reached  dur-­‐‑
ing  the  International  Joint  Commissions  (ĲC)  investigation.8  The dispute centered on 
the  wa ing  of  SO2 over the international boundary into Washington.  The claim was 
based on nuisance, caused by a Canadian company to American citizens.9  The compa-­‐‑
ny,  The  Consolidated  Mining  and  Smelting  Company,  is  now  known  as  Teck-­‐‑Cominco,  
listed  on  the  Toronto  Stock  Exchange  (TSX)  and  the  New  York  Stock  exchange  (NYSE)  
as TCK.10  The arbitration resulted in an order that the smelter refrain from causing 
further damage to Washington.11  This order created a precedent that has since been 
espoused in international environmental law: 
States have […] the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant  to  their  own  environmental  and  developmental  policies;  and  the  
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control 
7  Supra note 1.
8  Ibid. 
9  John E Reid, The Trail Smelter Dispute, in  Rebecca  M.  Bratspies  &  Russel  A.  Miller,  eds.,  
Transboundary Harm in International Law Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration (New  York:  
Cambridge  University  Press,  2006)  at  27.  
10    Teck,  “Quotes  and  Prices”  Teck  (viewed  27  November  2009),  online:  Teck  <h p://www.teck.
com/>.  
11    Stephan  C.  McCafrey,  “Of  Paradoxes,  Precedents,  and  Progeny:  The  Trail  Smelter  Arbitration  65  
Years  Later”  in  Rebecca  M.  Bratspies  &  Russel  A.  Miller,  eds.,  Transboundary Harm in International Law 
Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration  (New  York:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2006)  at  34.  
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do not cause damage to the environment of other States.12
At  the  time  the  tribunal  was   looking  for  “a  balanced  solution,  one  that  neither  shut  
down  the  smelter  nor  le   the  agricultural  interests  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  the  fumes.”13 
This balancing still occurs in states that are forced to decide between environmental 
protection and foreign investment revenue.  Today, the operations in Trail continue, 
but the emissions are subject to regulatory measures under Canadian law. 
The Trail Smelter dispute dealt with a clash of sovereignties: the Canadian right to ex-­‐‑
ploit  natural  resources  and  recover  profits,  pi ed  against  the  American  right  to  be  free  
from external harm.14  The clash led to the articulation of two international law princi-­‐‑
ples:  first,  a  state  has  a  duty  to  prevent  transboundary  harm;  and  second,  the  “polluter  
pays” principle, which dictates that a polluter has the duty to pay for proven harm 
resulting from the pollution it causes.15  Both  of  these  principles  are  still  present  in  in-­‐‑
ternational environmental law, and both have the potential to erode state sovereignty. 
Generally,  the  right  to  sovereignty  gives  a  state  unlimited  authority  to  control  pollution  
within that state’s boundaries.16  
This concept of state sovereignty is also eroded by international foreign investment 
through  another  well  accepted  international  law  principle,  namely  that  “sovereignty  
over  a  purely  domestic  ma er  [can]  be  restricted  if  there  is  an  international  treaty  deal-­‐‑
ing  with  the  ma er.”17  Through treaties, multinational corporations are able to encour-­‐‑
age states to negotiate and sign away their sovereignty, which results in multinational 
corporations obtaining power over states’ pollution control policies.  This phenom-­‐‑
enon  conflicts  with  a  state’s  duty  to  prevent  harm,  and  weakens  the  “polluter  pays”  
principle by decreasing a state’s ability to change the harm threshold, resulting in inac-­‐‑
tion  on  new  scientific  evidence  and  enforcement  of  the  “polluter  pays”  principle.  
The Trail Smelter  case  has  o en  been  characterized  as  a  dispute  between  two  nations;  
however,  as  Miller  points  out,  the  dispute  can  also  be  characterized  as  one  that  pi ed  
transnational business interests (i.e. those of The Consolidated Mining and Smelting 
Company)   against   a   single-­‐‑issue   non-­‐‑governmental   organization,   the   Citizens’  
Protective Association.18     This  argument   is   strengthened  by   the   fact   that  “US  smelt-­‐‑
12  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992,  FCCC/INFORMAL/84,  GE.05-­‐‑
62220,  (entered  into  force  21  March  1994)  at  preamble.  
13   Supra  note  11  at  37.
14     Rebecca  M.  Bratspies  &  Russel  A.  Miller,  eds.,  Transboundary Harm in International Law Lessons 
from the Trail Smelter Arbitration (New  York:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2006)  at  3.
15  Ibid.  at  3;  Since  this  time,  the  polluter  pays  principle  has  been  further  articulated  in  international  
law and it is thought that this may now arguably be a principle of customary international law ac-­‐‑
cording to Meinhard Doelle, From Hot Air to Climate Change, Compliance and the Future of International 
Environmental Law (Toronto: Carswell, 2005) at 10.
16     M.  Sronarajah,  The  International  Law  on  Foreign  Investment,  (2004:  Cambridge  University  
Press,  New  York,  USA)  at  97.
17  Ibid. at 105. 
18    Russell  A.  Miller,  “Surprising  parallels  between  Trail  Smelter  and  the  Global  Climate  Regime”  in  
Bratspies  &  Miller,  supra  note  14  at  168-­‐‑171.  
68                                         Race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑Bo om   Vol.  19
ing  interests  sought  leave  (unsuccessfully)  to  join  the  ma er  on  the  Canadian  side.”19 
Re-­‐‑characterizing  the  dispute  highlights  the  important  role  of  multinational  business  
interests and citizen groups in the regulation of harmful pollutants.
3. The Early Days – Global Recognition of the Issue
Following the Trail Smelter case, more instances of harm stemming from smelting op-­‐‑
erations came to light in the industrialized world: 
Scientific  evidence  of  the  acidification  of  aquatic  systems  in  Scandinavia  
and  North  America  mounted  throughout  the  1960’s  and  1970’s.    Between  
1972  and  1977,  evidence  linked  acidification  to  the  long-­‐‑range  transport  of  
sulphur dioxide from sources in other countries – for Scandinavia, nations 
of  continental  Europe,  and  for  Canada,  the  United  States;  within  Canada  
there  was  also  long-­‐‑range  transport  between  provinces.20
The harm resulting from acid rain, and more broadly from SO2  emissions,  was  linked  
to respiratory problems, ecosystem damage, and property damage.  The source pollu-­‐‑
tion  was  linked  to  the  metal  smelting  industry,  fossil-­‐‑fuelled  power  plants,  and  other  
industrial  fossil-­‐‑fuel  combustion  sources.21    This  link  created  a  direct  target  for  advo-­‐‑
cates of regulation. 
An increased awareness of harm and the cause of such harm initiated a desire to change 
industrial processes and materials in the developed world.  International negotiations 
were  entered   into  and  scientific  research  was  embarked  upon,  both  with   the  aim  of  
creating  a  be er  understanding  of   the  effects  of  acid  deposition,  and  of  curbing  the  
resulting harm.  States such as Canada began to introduce regulatory measures and 
to sign international protocols in relation to the issue.  However, the response was not 
mirrored by the developed world, whose constituent states were not parties to the 
conventions.
4. Increased Regulation in the Developed World
As indicated above, the target for regulation was SO2-­‐‑producing   industries.      In   the  
developed world, corporations control the metal smelting industry.  Regulating multi-­‐‑
national corporations is a complex problem.  I will examine two main ways this regula-­‐‑
tion occurs: individual state regulation, and bilateral or multilateral treaties and agree-­‐‑
ments.  My exploration is focused on the regulation of SO2 emissions.  It is also focused 
on international and regional agreements to which Canada is a party, and on domestic 
19  Ibid. at 170.
20    Environment  Canada,  “Acid  Rain  History”  (viewed  20  November  2009),  online:  EC  <h p://www.
ec.gc.ca/cleanair-­‐‑airpur/Pollution_Issues/Acid_Rain/History-­‐‑WSBE9908B0-­‐‑1_En.htm>.  
21    Environment  Canada,  “Main  Emission  Sources”  (viewed  20  November  2009),  online:  EC  <h p://
www.ec.gc.ca/cleanair-­‐‑airpur/Pollution_Issues/Acid_Rain/Main_Emission_Sources-­‐‑WSC9867689-­‐‑
1_En.htm>.  
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regulations associated with such agreements.
Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties 
Corporations may be regulated indirectly through international mechanisms.  It is im-­‐‑
portant to recognize that international emission standards are a clear infringement on 
states’ sovereignty,22 which generally results in poor enforcement.  For this reason, in-­‐‑
ternational agreements are generally unenforceable unless adopted into domestic law. 
Looking  at  international  measures  helps  to  illustrate  what  type  of  measures  states  are  
willing  to  agree,  accept  and  adopt.    Generally,  multinational  international  agreements  
represent the lowest common denominator of environmental standards, as consensus 
is required.23  Table 1, below, represents a chart of the relevant bilateral and multilateral 
agreements on air pollution to which Canada is a party, along with a list of the other 
ratifying countries.
Table 1: International Agreements on Air Pollution to Which Canada is a Party 













Ratified:  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  
Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  
Germany,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxemburg,  
Netherlands,  Norway,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovakia,  
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States of America, European 
Community
The 994 Oslo 







Ratified:  Austria,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Canada,  
Croatia,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  
Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  
Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, 
Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  
Ukraine,  United  Kingdom,  European  Community
22    Lee  A.  Tavis,  “The  Globalization  Phenomena  and  Multinational  Corporate  Developmental  
Responsibility” in Oliver F. Williams, Global Codes of Conduct: An Idea Whose Time has Come (Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000) at 22.
23     Timothy  Swanson  &  Sam  Johnson,  Global Environmental Problems and International Environmental 
Agreements,  (UK:  Edward  Elgar  Publishing  Limited,  1999)  at  162-­‐‑163.




Canada and the 
Government  of  
the United States 




Canada and the USA
 
Both  the  AAEGO and the FRSE stem from the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution (CLRTAP),  which  entered  into  force  in  1983.29  The CLRTAP states, in the 
preamble, that the parties to the convention are: 
Cognizant of the references in the chapter on environment of the Final 
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe calling for  
cooperation  to  control  air  pollution  and  its  effects,  including  long-­‐‑range  
transport of air pollutants, and to the development through international 
cooperation of an extensive programme for the monitoring and evaluation 
of   long-­‐‑range   transport  of  air  pollutants,  starting  with  sulphur  dioxide 
and with possible extension to other pollutants.30
The  convention  goes  on  to  state  specific  goals  for  reporting  and  sharing  of  technology  
to reduce transboundary air pollution including SO2.  The AAEGO  sets  up  specific  re-­‐‑
duction targets for member states in regards to SO2 emissions,31 while the FRSE sets out 
the types of industries targeted and the potential for economic impacts on developing 
economies, with a focus on proper reporting of sulphur emissions in accordance with 
the adopted guidelines.32  The FRSE also sets out past emissions levels and proposes 
future limits on emissions. 
One  thing  to  note  when  looking  at  the  signatories  of  the  protocols  is  that  most,  if  not  
24 The  1999  Gothenburg  Protocol  to  Abate  Acidification,  Eutrophication  and  Ground-­‐‑level  Ozone  
(AAEGO), 30  November  1999,  online:  UNECE  h p://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/multi_h1.htm.
25   Signed  but  not  ratified  by:  Armenia,  Austria,  Canada,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Liechtenstein,  
Poland, and Republic of Moldova. There are also seven parties to the protocol who have not signed or 
ratified.
26 The 994 Oslo Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions (FRSE) 5 August 1998, online: 
UNECE  <h p://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/fsulf_h1.htm>.  
27   There  are  18  parties  to  the  treaty  who  have  not  signed  or  ratified  it.  
28 Air Quality Agreement, United States and Canada, 1991, online: International Joint Commission 
<h p://www.ĳc.org/rel/agree/air.html#a>.
29  The 979 Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP),  1983,  online:  
UNECE  h p://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/lrtap_h1.htm.
30   Ibid. at preamble. 
31   Supra  note  24  at  Annex  II,  Table  1.  
32   Supra  note  26  at  preamble.  
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all of the countries are considered developed nations.  According to the IMF they are 
all  in  the  top  50  richest  countries  (by  GDP),  except  for  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Hungary  and  
Slovenia, which are still within the top 75, and Cyprus – an outlier at 92.33
The AQA  between  Canada  and  the  USA  sets  out  specific  air  quality  objectives34 and is 
governed  by  the  International  Air  Quality  Advisory  Board  under  the  ĲC.    No  bilateral  
air quality agreements between Canada and other states were found to exist at this 
time. 
There is much academic criticism surrounding the usefulness of international environ-­‐‑
mental  law:  “texts  are  o en  phrased  in  a  very  vague  fashion,  so  as  to  garner  sufficient  
acceptances  to  give  them  effect,  or  (if  not)  they  imply  commitments  that  many  states  
find  unacceptable.”35     When  states  find   treaty  provisions  unacceptable,   there  are  al-­‐‑
ways  other  options  available  to  them,  such  as  “signing  the  convention  but  not  ratifying  
it, or signing with reservations.”36  These  realities  decrease  the  effectiveness  of  interna-­‐‑
tional environmental law.  Despite these criticisms, however, there is an overwhelming 
consensus on the importance of international law as a tool for dealing with environ-­‐‑
mental issues.37  Indeed, international law is required to deal with environmental is-­‐‑
sues, as these are, by nature, transboundary issues.38  Air pollution is but one example 
of an environmental problem that cries out for international standards and consensus. 
It remains the case, however, that in order for an international obligation to be binding 
on  states,  it  must  be  filtered  down  and  adopted  into  domestic  law.
Regulation at the Individual State Level
The  filtering  down  of  regulation  to  the  state  level  is  where  the  fear  of  “encourag[ing]  
a  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om,  where  countries  compete  for  foreign  direct  investment  and  try  
to increase their international competitiveness by relaxing environmental regulatory 
standards,”39 becomes most poignant.  Despite this concern, developed countries, 
which  rely  less  on  foreign  investment  dollars,  have  taken  action  against  SO2 emissions. 
Canada, for example, introduced the Eastern Canada Acid Rain Program in 1985.40 
This program and other actions on behalf of the Canadian government have resulted 
in  “sulphur  dioxide  emissions  [falling]  43  percent  in  Canada  between  1980  and  1995,  
largely because of regulations that caused [technological] changes to industrial pro-­‐‑
33     International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  “World  Economic  Outlook  Database,  October  2009”  
(viewed:  27  November  2009),  online:  IMF  h p://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ /weo/2009/02/weodata/
index.aspx. 
34   Supra note 28 at Article IV
35   Supra  note  23  at  162.  
36   Ibid.
37     Renato  Ruggiero,  “Trade  and  the  Environment”  in  WTO  Secretariat  ed.,  Trade, Development and 
the Environment (UK: Kluwer Law International Ltd., 2000) at 7. 
38   Ibid. 
39     Colin  Kirkpatrick  &  Serban  S.  Scrieciu,  “Is  Trade  Liberalisation  Bad  for  the  Environment?  A  
Review of the Economic Evidence” (2008) 51 Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 
497  at  499.  
40   Supra note 20. 
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cesses.”41  The USA, through the Clean Air Act,42  also  took  domestic  action  to  stop  SO2 
pollution.  Canada has enacted a series of legislative provisions that help to encour-­‐‑
age a reduction in air pollution and ensure Canada is in compliance with its interna-­‐‑
tional obligations.  One example of such this legislation is the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act (CEPA)43  where   toxic   substances  are  defined  and   regulations  are  en-­‐‑
abled to create a list of toxic substances. 44 
In  2003,  SO2 was added to the List of Toxic Substances of CEPA 1999,45 rendering SO2 
a toxic substance under the act.  The Minister also introduced a number of regulations 
under   s.   92.1   of   the   act.      These   regulations   reflect   additions   to   the   list   and   include  
Environmental Emergency Regulations,46 Regulations amending the Sulphur in Diesel Fuel 
Regulations47 and the Sulphur in Gasoline Regulations.48  There is also a set of proposed 
regulations,  dra ed  in  2006,  requiring  the  preparation  and  implementation  of  pollu-­‐‑
tion  prevention  plans  in  respect  of  specified  toxic  substances  released  from  base  metals  
smelters,  refineries  and  zinc  plants.49
In Canada this action has led to enforceable SO2 limits that have been leveraged against 
companies.    The  British  Columbia  Court  of  Appeal  held  that  “[w]hen  hydrogen  sul-­‐‑
phide is burned it produces sulphur dioxide which causes a serious air pollution prob-­‐‑
lem  known  as   acid   rain.”50  The Court went on to note that unacceptable emission 
levels could result in authorities restricting the emission of SO2.      In  1996  a  case  was  
brought before the Alberta Court of Appeal by a citizen group to hold Shell Canada to 
a more stringent emission standard then that which was outlined in the legislation due 
to  specific  community  concerns.  The  Alberta  Court  of  Appeal  held  that  as  long  as  Shell  
Canada  complied  with  its  permi ed  SO2  emissions,  there  was  no  need  to  address  site-­‐‑
specific  factors.51    In  dissent,  Conrad  J.A.  held  that,  “to  deny  local  ranchers  the  right  to  
call  evidence  of  the  effects  of  increased  emissions  of  sulphur  dioxide  on  ca le  alleged  
to  already  be  suffering  from  current  emissions  is,  in  my  view,  an  egregious  denial  of  
the  right  to  be  heard  by  an  affected  party.”52  These decisions highlight the importance 
41   David  R.  Boyd,  Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policy (Vancouver  BC:  
UBC  Press,  2003)  at  96.  
42   Clean Air Act, C.A.A.  tit  42  ch.  85  (1990).
43  Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA),  1999,  c.33.  
44   Ibid.  at  ss.  64,  92.1  and  93.  
45     Environment  Canada  “Substance  Detail”  (viewed  29  November  2009),  online:  EC  <h p://www.
ec.gc.ca/TOXICS/EN/detail.cfm?par_substanceID=161&par_actn=s1>.  
46   Environmental Emergency Regulations,  S.O.R./2003-­‐‑307  at  Schedule  1,  Part  2.
47   Regulations Amending the Sulphur in Diesel Regulations, S.O.R./2005-­‐‑305.
48   Sulphur in Gasoline Regulations, S.O.R./99-­‐‑236.  
49     Proposed  by  Rona  Ambrose  in  2006:  Notice  Requiring  the  preparation  and  implementation  of  
pollution  prevention  plans  in  respect  of  specified  toxic  substances  released  from  base  metals  smelt-­‐‑
ers  and  refineries  and  zinc  plants,  C.  Gaz.  2006.  I.  (April  29,  2006,  CEPA),  online:  The  Royal  Gaze e  
<h p://gaze e.gc.ca/archives/p1/2006/2006-­‐‑04-­‐‑29/html/notice-­‐‑avis-­‐‑eng.html#i5>.
50  Westcoast Transmission Ltd. v. Langley/Abbotsford Assessor, Area No. ,  2001  CarswellBC  464,  2001  
BCCA  188  at  para.  24.
51  Coalition of Citizens Impacted by the Caroline Shell Plant v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board),  1996  
CarswellAlta  689,  41  Alta.  L.R.  (3d)  374  at  para.  18.
52  Ibid. at para. 27. 
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of  enforceable  domestic  standards.  They  also  highlight  the  effectiveness  of  enforceable  
standards in ensuring that companies are liable for harm stemming from pollution 
sources.  
A  brief  search  of  other,  less  developed,  English-­‐‑speaking  jurisdictions  (such  as  India,53 
Kenya54 and the Philippines55) revealed no comparable emissions standards for SO2.
5. Global Shift in SO2 Emissions
Based  on  my  research,  there  has  been  an  increase  in  domestic  and  international  law  
regulating CO2 emissions in the developed world.  However, this response has not 
been  followed  by  developing  nations.     The  question  when  applying  the  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑
bo om  theory  then  becomes:  “has  the  unequal  implementation  of  policy  resulted  in  
a  global  shi   of  industry  and/or  pollution?”  This  section  looks  at  both  corporate  re-­‐‑
sponses to the regulations and the more general growth of SO2 emission in developing 
countries.
Shift in Corporate Smelting Operations
In this section, I will examine three companies with a history of smelting in Canada: 
Noranda-­‐‑Falconbridge,  Teck-­‐‑Cominoco  and  Corefco-­‐‑Sherri .    Table  2,  below,  outlines  
the expansion of the companies over the time period during which regulation of SO2 
emissions increased in the developed world. 
53     A  search  of  the  legislative  database  found  online:  Government  of  India  <h p://india.gov.in/
govt/acts.php>  under  Ministry  of  Environment  and  Forests,  Ministry  of  Coal  and  Ministry  of  Mines  
resulted in no relevant emission provisions. The most relevant act found was the Air (Prevention and 
Control of Pollution) Act,  1981  no.  14  of  1981  also  contains  no  specific  reference  to  SO2.
54   The Environmental Management and Coordination Act, 1999 No. 8 of 1999 (commencement 
14  January  2000)  of  Kenya  has  air  quality  standards  at  s.  78,  however,  I  could  not  find  any  specific  
emission  allowances  in  relation  to  s.78.  Online:  Government  of  Kenya,  <h p://www.reconcile-­‐‑ea.org/
wkelc/env_mgt_act.pdf>.    
55  The Philippines has the Greenhouse Gas Emission Atmospheric Removal Act of 008, Senate No. 
2292, which addresses greenhouse gas emissions, but has no mention of SO2. Online: Senate of the 
Philippines  14th  Congress,  <h p://www.senate.gov.ph/lisdata/73616578!.pdf>.    
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Table 2: Mining and/or smelting interests in Canada over time 
Company
Mining  and/or  smelting  operations  -­‐‑  locations



































A corporation may decide to relocate operations or purchase new assets for a number 
of reasons.  The increase in international operations over the years can be explained 
by a number of factors other than the increase in environmental regulation.  A more 
detailed  look  into  the  shi   in  smelting  operations  would  be  required  in  order  to  gather  
conclusive evidence that operations are being explored in areas with fewer regulations. 
However,  the  trend  established  by  the  above  table  is  still  significant,  as  it  indicates  that  
operations  are  taking  place  in  countries  that  have  not  ratified  international  agreements  
and  that  may  be  lacking  effective  domestic  regulation  of  SO2 pollution.  As air pollu-­‐‑
tion is a global problem, the fact that new operations are increasingly occurring in less 
developed countries is of concern. 
Academic literature suggests that the increase in enforceable regulation in the USA 
and   Canada  may   have   dampened   the   profits   of  metal   smelting   in   these   countries,  
56 Data gathered from the company’s website: Falconbridge, Locations,  online:  Falconbridge,  h p://
archive.xstrata.com/falconbridge/www.falconbridge.com/about_us/mining_life_cycle.htm.  Looked  at  
operations  on  the  location  map;  exploration  not  included.
57 Originally The Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company, which was subject to the Trail 
Smelter arbitration: supra note 1.
58 Information obtained by from the company website through comparing the operations page 
with  the  history  page,  online:  Teck,  h p://www.teck.com/Generic.
59 Information obtained from the company website through the global operations page, online: 
Sherrit,  h p://www.sherri .com/doc08/index.php?category=front_page/front_col02/.  
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thereby  encouraging  the  shi    to  other   locations:  “[s]tricter  American  environmental  
regulations  have   contributed   to   the   international  dispersion  of   some  basic  mineral-­‐‑
processing industries, such as cooper, zinc, and lead processing.”60    The  shi ,  however,  
cannot be fully accounted for by the new domestic environmental regulations – the 
availability  of   resources  also  greatly  contributes   to   the   shi .61  A study on Japanese 
foreign  direct   investment   (FDI)   showed   that  while   overall   a   regulatory   race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑
bo om  was  not  apparent,  “environmental  regulations  generally  had  larger  impact  on  
Japanese  FDI  decisions  for  resource-­‐‑based  industries  compared  to  non-­‐‑resource  based  
industries.”62
Shift in Global SO2 Emissions
While  the  shi   in  smelting  operations  may  not  be  conclusive,  overall  there  has  been  a  
global  shi   in  SO2  emission  to  developing  countries.    It  should  be  noted  that  the  shi   
is not entirely due to a change in industry location, as the data does not account for a 
number of economic development factors: 
In some parts of Europe, the anthropogenic SO2 emissions, which lead 
to acid precipitation, have been reduced by nearly 70 per cent from their 
maximum  values;  there  have  also  been  reductions  of  some  40  per  cent  in  
the  United  States.    This  has  resulted  in  a  significant  recovery  of  the  natural  
acid balance, at least in Europe.  On the contrary, as a result of the growing 
use of coal and other high sulphur fuels, increasing SO2 emissions in the 
Asia  and  Pacific  Region  are  a  serious  environmental  threat.63
The gains made by developed countries in emission reductions have been countered 
by  the  increase  in  emissions  in  the  developing  world.    A  comprehensive  study  looking  
at  sulphur  emissions  from  the  years  1850-­‐‑2000  found  that  overall  global  SO2 emissions 
have increased and are still rising.64  The study notes that there have been a number of 
advancements  in  technology  that  have  reduced  emission  in  countries  such  as  Germany  
and stabilized emission in the former USSR and the USA.65 
Other  studies  have  indicated  that  there  is  proof  that  emissions  have  shi ed  eastward  
and  southward  on  a  global  basis,  and  that  this  shi   is  much  more  dramatic  than  origi-­‐‑
nally predicted.66    Much  of  this  shi   is  due  to  events  in  rapidly  industrializing  countries,  
such  as  China:  “[i]n  the  1990s  Asia  became  the  largest  source  area.  Chinese  emissions  
60     Jeffery  H.  Leonard,  Pollution and the Struggle for the World Product: Multinational Corporations: 
Environment and International Comparative Advantage,  (New  York:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1988)  at  
111. 
61   Ibid.
62     Colin  Kirkpatrick  &  Kenichi  Shimamoto,  “The  Effect  of  Environmental  Regulation  on  the  
Location  Choice  of  Japanese  Foreign  Direct  Investment”  (2008)  40  Applied  Economics  1399  at  1406.  
63   Supra  note  4  at  “air  pollution  and  air  quality.”  
64   Supra  note  3  at  3441.  
65   Ibid.  at  3435.  
66     David  I.  Stern,  “Global  Sulfur  Emissions  from  1850  to  2000”  (2005)  58  Chemosphere  163  at  170.  
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overtook  US  emissions  in  1987  to  make  China  the  largest  single  emi er.”67 With the 
shi   in  emissions  there  has  also  been  a  shi   in  associated  health  concerns.  According  
to the World Health Organization, more than half of the disease burden resulting from 
air pollution is felt by developing countries.68
Overall, the data shows support for the conclusion that SO2 emissions are increasing 
globally, despite the reduction in emissions in the developed world. 
III. ANALYSIS
The  data  showing  an  increase  in  regulations  only  weakly  supports  a  causal  connection  
with   the  shi    in   industrial   location.     This  weak  connection  has  been  noted   in  other  
studies  and  the  literature  has  concluded  that  “a  major  methodological  problem  is  that  
it  is  difficult  to  single  out  the  effects  of  any  one  factor  in  assessing  either  international  
comparative advantage or individual industrial location decisions.”69     This  difficulty  
makes   it  hard   to   substantiate  an  argument   that   corporations  are   choosing   locations  
based on a single environmental advancement.  However, the results and literature, 
when  looked  at  on  a  broader  scale,  show  that  a  shi   is  occurring.    Regardless  of  the  
reason(s) for corporate relocation, increasing regulations in the developed world have 
not resulted in a decrease of global SO2 emissions. 
Based  on  the  evidence  in  the  preceding  case  study,  two  main  things  are  apparent:  first,  
there has been an increase in regulation in developed countries both at the interna-­‐‑
tional and domestic level, and second, global sulphur emissions have increased. This 
conclusion  highlights  the  need  to  rethink  global  environmental  governance.  
While the evidence on corporate location is less persuasive, economic literature on the 
race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om  theory  and  the  effect  on  corporate  location  choices  support  the  con-­‐‑
clusion that trade and investment liberalization has resulted in negative environmen-­‐‑
tal impacts.70     Much  of  the  literature  cautions  against  taking  a  generalized  approach  
to global environmental problems and highlights the need for a contextual analysis of 
these problems at the global level.71    Solutions  to  the  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om  phenomenon  
should  be  made  at  a  more  comprehensive,  global  level  to  be  effective.     Industry  has  
the ability to choose the location in which it will invest, resulting in the potential for 
corporations to escape regulatory standards at the domestic level unless the regulation 
occurs higher up, at a global level.
67   Ibid.  at  168.  
68   Supra  note  5  at  17-­‐‑18.
69   Supra  note  60  at  87.  
70  Supra  note  39  at  506.
71  Ibid.
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V. DISCUSSION
Today, when issues similar to those of the Trail Smelter case occur, the number of legal 
concerns  is  far  greater  than  in  1941.    Given  advances  in  corporate  law,  questions  such  
as where the company was incorporated, whether the company is a subsidiary and 
how closely the subsidiary is connected to the parent company become very relevant. 
Further,   given   the   international  nature   of  many   corporations,  we  must   also   look   at  
any investment treaties that may have been signed between two involved countries, 
and  any  so   law  principles  that  may  exist.    The  rise  of  multinational  corporations  has  
resulted  in  uncertainty  over  “the  obligation  of  the  home  state  to  ensure  that  its  multi-­‐‑
national corporations comply with environmental standards in the host states, particu-­‐‑
larly if these standards are in accordance with emerging international environmental 
law.”72  The rise in corporate power has enabled corporations to escape strict environ-­‐‑
mental standards in the developed world in favour of lower production costs in the 
developing world. 
The  market  economy  was  once  praised  as  the  solution  to  poverty.    Development  theo-­‐‑
rists  advanced  the  idea  that  liberal  market  capitalism  and  good  governance  were  the  
answer  to  global  poverty;  the  World  Bank  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund  agreed  
with  this  idea,  and  a  number  of  policies  were  put  in  place  to  increase  market  capitalism  
in the developing world.73    With  the  advance  of  the  global  market  economy  came  the  
rise of multinational corporations and globalization: 
Globalization   is   perceived   as   being   both   a   threat   and   a   promise.      The  
promise is seen in the rising prosperity experienced by many rich and 
poor  countries  alike  in  the  a ermath  of  international  linkages.    The  threat  
is the growing perceptions, by nations and individuals, that no longer can 
we control our way of life.74
The  fear  of  losing  control  is  o en    shrouded  in  the  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om  theory.    The  the-­‐‑
ory  rests  on  the  idea  that  as  competition  to  a ract  foreign  investment  dollars  increases,  
the incentive for regulation decreases.  The more power foreign investment dollars 
have over the type and amount of regulation that is enacted, the less control nations 
have  over  governing  their  citizens.  The  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om  theory  can  affect  all  types  of  
regulation, from human rights regulation to environmental regulation. 
Environmental  regulation  is  of  particular  interest  at  this  time  as,  unlike  human  rights  
regulation,  there  is  no  current  consensus  as  to  what  constitutes  “fundamental  environ-­‐‑
mental  rights.”    There  may  be  an  emerging  idea  of  what  constitutes  pollution;  however,  
the degree of acceptable pollution varies throughout the world.  This problem creates 
72  Supra  note  16  at  180.
73     David  Po er,  “Democratization,  ‘Good  Governance’  and  Development”  in  Tim  Allen  &  Alan  
Thomas eds., Poverty and Development in to the st Century,  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  
2000)  at  375.
74   Oliver F. Williams, Global Codes of Conduct: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2005) at xiii. 
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greater acceptance of individual states’ decisions to pollute.  This political reality is out 
of  step  with  the  scientific  reality  that  environmental  pollution  is  a  transboundary  issue  
that  affects  all  global  states,  due  to  the  interconnected  nature  of  global  environmental  
systems.     Air  pollution  is  an  excellent  example  of  how  the  effects  on  one  nation  can  
greatly impact all global nations.  Currently, our international regime is not equipped 
to deal with the complexity of environmental degradation.  The following sections will 
highlight these inadequacies.
1. Regulating Environmental Harm
Regulation  of  the  environment,  and  more  specifically  of  the  air,  is  a  very  complex  legal  
issue.    It  brings  forward  a  suite  of  questions  including,  what  is  environmental  harm?  
When  does   a  disturbance  of   the  natural   environment  become  harmful?  When  does  
environmental  harm  become  transnational  harm?  Generally,   these  questions  are  an-­‐‑
swered  at  the  state  level;  however,  state-­‐‑level  answers  are  increasingly  seen  to  be  inef-­‐‑
fective when dealing with global problems. 
O en,  environmental  questions  are  political  and  value  laden,75 and are seen to interfere 
with  state  sovereignty.    This,  along  with  the  reality  that  environmental  harm  knows  no  
boundaries,  results  in  the  creation  of  a  difficult  legal  problem.    Multinational  corpora-­‐‑
tions,  much  like  environmental  harm,  have  become  international  concerns,  as  liberal  
economic theory has transcended state boundaries.  Contemporary systems of envi-­‐‑
ronmental law are not prepared to deal with the issues raised by environmental deg-­‐‑
radation.    Corporations  are  built  to  “treat  environmental  management  as  a  ma er  of  
business acumen, technological innovation, or obedience to regulatory commands.”76 
This system of dealing with environmental problems has been critiqued, as it does not 
“safeguard  ecological  systems  over  the  long  term.”77 
The  global  inability  to  react  to  environmental  degradation  can  be  linked  to  liberal  eco-­‐‑
nomic  market-­‐‑based  thinking.    The  market  system  is  set  up  to  evaluate  success  based  
on  economic  goals:  “[t]his  economic  rationality  both  fuels  environmental  degradation  
and  constrains  policy  solutions  when  financial  or  other  ‘concrete’  grounds  to  motivate  
action  are  seemingly   lacking.”78     The  market  system  views  environmental  resources  
as  “natural  assets”  and,  with  capital  value  provided,  they  can  be  exploited  and  turned  
into goods.79    It  is  this  market  view  which  has  helped  to  encourage  the  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bot-­‐‑
tom, where environmental concerns are seen as external products or liabilities within 
the system.
75  This reality is seen in international environmental movements where concerns of poverty, race, 
gender  and  socio-­‐‑economic  equality  are  commonplace  in  the  debates.  
76     Benjamin  J.  Richardson,  “Pu ing  Ethics  into  Environmental  Law:  Fiduciary  Duties  for  Ethical  
Investment”  (2008)  46  Osgoode  Hall  L.J.  1  at  3.  
77  Ibid. 
78  Ibid.  at  4.  
79  Supra  note  23  at  4.
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2. Race-to-the-bottom Theory
The regulation of multinational corporations is a controversial issue on the global 
stage.    Generally,  regulation  occurs  at  the  state  level,  such  that  environmental  regula-­‐‑
tion  is  o en  seen  as  a  detriment  to  investment.    States  that  are  competing  for  foreign  
investment income fear that the pressure to stay competitive means that they must sac-­‐‑
rifice  citizens’  rights  to  strong  environmental  regulation.80  The pressure felt by these 
states  makes  it  hard  to  justify  policies  that  may  increase  the  cost  of  business.81 
An  empirical  study  that  looked  at  regulatory  competition  and  environmental  enforce-­‐‑
ment measures found that states do, in fact, react to regulatory measures introduced 
by other states.82  The study found that states are cognizant of environmental poli-­‐‑
cies  enacted  by  neighbouring  and  similarly-­‐‑situated  states,  and  that  they  react  to  these  
policies within their own state.83  However, this reaction was found to occur as both a 
race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑top  as  well  as  a  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om.84  These results indicate that there may 
be a race away from the middle with respect to environmental standards, where states 
do  not  want  to  be  out  of  synchronization  with  the  regulatory  levels  of  other,  similarly-­‐‑
situated states. 
Another  study,  conducted  to  examine  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om  theory  specifically  as  it  ap-­‐‑
plies   to   air   pollution   regulations   in   the  USA,   looked   at   the   competitive   advantage  
gained by US states in adopting a low standard in relation to the Clean Air Act.85   The 
study   found   that  US   states  did  not   embark   in   a   race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om   regarding   clean  
air   legislation.     However,   it  did   indicate   that   there  was  value   in  se ing  a  minimum  
standard  to  ensure  that  a  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om  does  not  occur:  “it  is  possible  that  in  the  
absence of national minimum standards, some [US] states might still lower their clean 
air policies below what the USEAP currently requires.”86  The study indicated the 
power  of  “green  political  dynamics”  to  resist  the  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om  in  US  states  such  
as Maine and California.87    This  argument  may  be  seen  to  support  the  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑top  
theory,  but  Konisky  addresses  this  hypothesis,  and  notes  that  the  argument  misses  the  
complex  nature  of  state  interaction:  “states  may  differ  in  important  respects  (e.g.,  the  
size  and  structure  of  their  economies)  that  may  make  them  more  susceptible  to  race  to  
the  bo om  behaviour  or  more  likely  to  engage  in  race  to  the  top  behaviour.”88
80    Robert  Chernoman  &  Ian  Hudson,  Social Murder and Other Shortcomings of Conservative 
Economics,  (Winnipeg  Manitoba:  Arbeiter  Ring  Publishing,  2007)  at  26.  
81  Ibid. 
82    David  M.  Konisky,  “Regulatory  Competition  and  Environmental  Enforcement:  Is  There  a  Race  
to  the  Bo om?”  (2007)  51  American  Journal  of  Political  Science  853,  at  853-­‐‑872.  
83   Ibid.
84   Ibid.
85    Ma hew  Potoski,  “Environmental:  Clean  Air  Federalism:  Do  States  Race  to  the  Bo om?”  (2001)  
61  Public  Administration  Review  335  at  335-­‐‑343;  supra  note  42.  
86   Supra  note  8  at  341.
87  Ibid.  at  339.  
88  Supra  note  6  at  855.  
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Overall, the two studies support the conclusion that states are responsive to the ad-­‐‑
vancements of other states regarding environmental policies, and that acceptance of 
a  minimum  standard  helps  to  increase  the  potential  for  a  competitive  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑top.  
Currently,  on  a  global  scale,  the  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om  is  more  prevalent,  as  developing  
nations  are  more  reliant  on  foreign  investment  dollars:  “[a]cross  the  world,  develop-­‐‑
ing  countries  in  their  a empts  to  a ract  foreign  investment  dollars  are  not  support-­‐‑
ing labor and are turning a blind eye to environmental protection.”89  Following from 
Konisky’s  theory,  other  academics  have  made  the  argument  that  while  the  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑
bo om  may  not  be  triggered  in  developed  countries,  “globalization  does  indeed  trig-­‐‑
ger  a  race  to  the  bo om  in  developing  countries.”90  This divided race to both the top 
and  the  bo om  is  resulting  in  greater  global  inequality,  coinciding  with  the  adoption  
of global economic liberalization – the same economic liberalization that has lead to 
the increasing wealth of multinational corporations.  Developing nations are thought 
to  be  ba ling   for  access   to   the  wealth  promised   from   foreign   investment   stemming  
from  these  corporations  that  now  comprise  “51  of  the  top  100  economic  entities  in  the  
world,” including independent states.91 
Corporations,  unlike  states,  are  driven  exclusively  by  a  profit  motive,  and  therefore  
have an interest in doing business at the lowest cost.  Competition creates either a 
race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om,  or  in  some  cases  a  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑top,  but  either  way  competition  is  
premised   on   a   conflict   between   companies’   profit   motive   and   government   regula-­‐‑
tion.92     It  may  be  that  this  divide  between  the  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑top  and  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om  
is  premised  on  a  development  index  based  on  differences  in  levels  of  economic  and  
industrial  development.    The  divide  can  also  be  a ributed  to  the  uneven  bargaining  
power between rich developed nations and their corporations, and poorer developing 
economies;  these  developing  economies  are  o en  forced  to  sit  at  the  bargaining  table  
with corporations that have a greater net worth than those of the states themselves. 
This  imbalance  o en  results  in  corporate  policies  winning  the  day.    Indeed,  “[t]he  most  
fanatical supporters of deregulation are multinational companies, some of which have 
the power to put pressure for less strict rules or even to challenge government deci-­‐‑
sions in order to achieve a more lenient, if not deregulated government.”93 
Fewer   regulations  help   in   ensuring   that  profits   are  maximized.      It   should  be  noted  
that  lenient  regulation  is  not  just  an  entry  criterion;  many  multinationals  also  have  an  
interest, when investing, in ensuring that the lax laws and regulations do not change. 
O en   included  as  part  of  bilateral   trade  agreements   is  a  “freeze”  on  environmental  
regulations,  to  exclude  the  option  for  increased  regulation  in  the  face  of  new  scientific  
proof of harm.94    This  strategy  o en  results  in  states  not  being  allowed  to  be  responsive  
89  Supra note 22 at 18.
90  Nita Rudra, Globalization  and  the  Race  to  the  Bo om  in  Developing  Countries,  Who  Really  Gets  Hurt?  
(UK:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2008)  at  3.  
91  Supra note 80 at 5. 
92    Stelios  Andreadakis,  “Regulatory  Competition  vs.  Harmonization:  Is  There  a  Third  Way?”  (2009)  
6  International  and  Comparative  Corporate  Law  Journal  41  at  43-­‐‑46.  
93   Ibid.  at  44.
94   Supra  note  16  at  180.  
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to  new  environmental  concerns,  thus  freezing  the  race  at  the  bo om.  
Currently,  a  global  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om  is  occurring  in  relation  to  environmental  con-­‐‑
cerns.  Research has shown that the imposition of minimum standards helps to fa-­‐‑
cilitate  a  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑top.    Binding  global  environmental  standards  have  the  ability  to  
stop  the  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om,  empower  developing  nations  to  stand  up  to  multinational  
corporations,  and  perhaps  move  us  collectively  towards  a  truly  global  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑top.
3. A New International Approach
Given  the  complex  reality  involved  in  governing  environmental  concerns  and  the  cur-­‐‑
rent  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om  phenomenon,  the  question  then  becomes:  how  do  we  regulate  
multinationals?  I  propose  that  instead  of  seeing  multinational  corporations  and  envi-­‐‑
ronmental regulation as divergent concepts, we ought to use the stateless commonality 
of these ideas to create comprehensive regulation.  Historically, environmental harms 
have been dealt with through trade restrictions or international agreements.95     Both  
of  these  options  still  deal  with  the  regulation  of  individual  states.    By  looking  at  the  
issue from another view, which recognizes the harm or the environmental issue as the 
starting  point,  perhaps  we  can  develop  a  more  effective  solution.    If  the  international  
community were to view these problems at the issue level, then stateless corporations 
might not be able to avoid regulation.  If there were consensus on how to govern the 
issue, then regardless of where a corporation was situated, they would be governed. 
Multinational corporations are unique entities in that they have the ability to escape 
domestic  law  by  racing  to  the  bo om;  however,  a  system  that  takes  into  account  the  
global  nature  of  these  firms  may  help  to  address  global  environmental  problems.
The next issue becomes one of compliance.  This is an issue that is not new to inter-­‐‑
national  law  scholars,  and  there  is  an  overwhelming  sentiment  that  the  way  we  think  
about international law needs to be challenged.  Academics have recognized the dif-­‐‑
ficulty  in  moving  forward  with  global  regulation  and  thinking:  
To achieve the necessary international consensus, governments will need 
to rely on a fresh supply of intellectual capital generated either internally 
or  in  universities  and  think  tanks.    New  negotiating  tools  and  techniques  
may be required as well as more robust institutions and approaches to 
the  resolution  of  conflict.    In  effect,  the  next  decade  is  likely  to  see  a  major  
reconsideration of the design, content and techniques of the international 
trade regime.96
How  can  we  create  agreement  at  the  international  level?    Joyner  suggests  that  this  can  
95    Andrew  P.  Morriss  &  Roger  E.  Meiners,  “Borders  and  the  Environment”  (2009)  39  
Environmental  Law  141  at  144.  
96     Michael  Hart,  “Coercion  or  Cooperation:  Social  Policy  and  Future  Trade  Negotiations”  (1994)  20  
Canada-­‐‑United  States  Law  Journal  at  24.
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be done with the creation of transnational partnerships that are issue focused.97  These 
issue-­‐‑based  partnerships  would  be  charged  with  solving  an  environmental  problem  
and  would  be  funded  by  the  various  stakeholders:  governments,   intergovernmental  
organizations,   non-­‐‑governmental   organizations   and   multinational   corporations.98 
Provided that funding is adequate, and legally binding solutions are created, trans-­‐‑
national interest coalitions may be the best solution we have for dealing with global 
environmental problems.  It is important to note the presence of multinational corpora-­‐‑
tions  within  the  list  of  stakeholders:  “given  the  power  of  multinationals,  individually  
and  collectively,   these  firms  incur  and  increase  responsibility  for  systemic  results.”99 
Encouraging the presence of these actors will help to ensure that binding agreements 
are created.  It is important to ensure that these actors are present from the start of the 
process, and that the players are equal, so that fair regulation results from the process. 
Creating  global   environmental   regulations  on   air  pollution  will   “raise   the  bo om.”  
A  rise  in  the  global  minimum  standards  may  help  to  foster  a  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑top  and  will  
ensure  that  states  seeking  foreign  investment  can  bargain  on  a  level  playing  field  while  
ensuring global environmental protection.
CONCLUSION
Race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om  theory  implies  that  as  states  compete  for  foreign  investment  dollars,  
they  reduce  their  environmental  and/or  human  rights  regulations  in  order  to  increase  
their competitiveness.  Studies have shown that globally, in response to environmental 
standards,  there  is  a  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑top  among  developed  nations  and  a  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bot-­‐‑
tom among developing states.  Sulphur dioxide legislation provides a good example 
of   this   divide,   as   developed  nations   have   taken   action   to   increase   regulation  while  
many  developing  and  transitional  economies  are  lagging  behind.     Globalization  has  
increased the mobility of smelting corporations and has resulted in increased invest-­‐‑
ments in developing nations that are not parties to international conventions dealing 
with SO2 emissions.  Due to the disparity in regulatory action, the global problem of 
SO2  emission  has  been  found  to  shi   from  developing  countries  to  developed  countries.  
This  shi   highlights  the  race-­‐‑to-­‐‑the-­‐‑bo om,  and  results  in  an  overall  negative  effect,  
given the transboundary nature of air pollution.  International agreements, through 
the  creation  of  issue-­‐‑focused  coalitions  made  up  of  various  stakeholder  groups,  includ-­‐‑
ing multinationals, is necessary to ensure that global governance of the commons is 
achieved.    Coalitions  must  seek  to  achieve  solutions  that  are  legally  binding  and  that 
will  “raise  the  bo om”  so  that  all  incentives  are  taken  out  of  the  race.  
97    Christopher  C.  Joyner,  “Rethinking  International  Environmental  Regimes:  What  Role  for  
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